Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxation under Loose Commitment by Jang-Ting Guo & Alan Krause
Discussion Papers in Economics





Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxation under Loose Commitment
By
Jang-Ting Guo, University of California, Riverside
Alan Krause, University of YorkOptimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxation under
Loose Commitment￿
Jang-Ting Guoy





This paper examines an in￿nite-horizon model of dynamic nonlinear income
taxation in which there exists a small probability that the government cannot
commit to its future tax policy. In this ￿loose commitment￿ environment, we
￿nd that even a little uncertainty over whether the government can commit yields
substantial e⁄ects on the optimal dynamic nonlinear income tax system. Under
an empirically plausible parameterization, numerical simulations show that high-
skill individuals must be subsidized in the short run, despite the government￿ s
redistributive objective, unless the probability of commitment is higher than 98%.
Loose commitment also reverses the short-run welfare e⁄ects of changes in most
model parameters. In particular, all individuals are worse-o⁄, rather than better-
o⁄, in the short run when the proportion of high-skill individuals in the economy
increases. Finally, our main ￿ndings remain qualitatively robust to a setting in
which loose commitment is modelled as a Markov switching process.
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There is currently a great deal of interest in dynamic nonlinear income taxation, as
exempli￿ed by the ￿new dynamic public ￿nance￿ literature which extends the static
Mirrlees [1971] model of nonlinear income taxation to a dynamic setting.1 In the Mir-
rlees model, individuals are distinguished by their skill levels, which results in di⁄erences
in their income-earning abilities. However, the government cannot implement (the ￿rst-
best) personalized lump-sum taxation based on skills as the Second Welfare Theorem
would recommend, owing to the assumption that each individual￿ s skill type is private
information. Instead, the government can only implement (the second-best) incentive-
compatible nonlinear income taxation under which each individual is willing to reveal
their skill type. In dynamic versions of the Mirrlees model, however, skill-type informa-
tion revealed in period 1 could, in principle, be used by the government to implement
personalized lump-sum taxation from period 2 onwards. In order to avoid this out-
come, the new dynamic public ￿nance literature typically assumes that the government
can commit to its future tax policy.2 That is, the government continues to implement
incentive-compatible taxation even after individuals have revealed their types.
It seems possible to make convincing arguments in favor of assuming either commit-
ment or no-commitment. For example, one might defend the commitment assumption
on the basis that real-world income tax systems are not frequently redesigned,3 and be-
cause there are long-run bene￿ts to be gained by a government that makes and keeps its
promises. On the other hand, the commitment assumption has been criticized as being
unrealistic, since the present government cannot easily impose binding constraints on
the policies of future governments.4 Accordingly, models of dynamic nonlinear income
taxation without commitment have been developed by Apps and Rees [2006], Brett
1Examples of the new dynamic public ￿nance literature include Kocherlakota [2005], Albanesi and
Sleet [2006] and Werning [2007], while surveys are provided by Golosov, et al. [2006, 2010]. For a
textbook treatment of the new dynamic public ￿nance, see Kocherlakota [2010].
2For example, the papers by Kocherlakota [2005], Albanesi and Sleet [2006] and Werning [2007] all
assume that the government can commit.
3Gaube [2007] makes this argument.
4Auerbach [2006] cites the example of a proposal made to resolve the U.S. Social Security system￿ s
imbalance, which includes a tax increase to be made by the government in 2045. As Auerbach notes,
such a proposal cannot be taken too seriously.
2and Weymark [2008], Krause [2009], and Guo and Krause [2010a], among others. The
structure of these models is relatively simple,5 which allows them to make direct com-
parisons of optimal nonlinear income taxation with and without commitment. However,
due mainly to the use of general preference formulations, attention has been restricted
to comparing the signs of the optimal marginal tax rates,6 which does not really ex-
pose the full extent to which optimal nonlinear income tax systems may di⁄er when the
government can and cannot commit.
Since the assumptions of commitment or no-commitment can be viewed as polar
cases, in this paper we depart from the existing literature by assuming that the gov-
ernment can commit to its future tax policy with probability p, and therefore cannot
commit with probability (1 ￿ p). However, when the government cannot commit, it
is well-known that the ￿revelation principle￿may no longer hold. That is, it may no
longer be social-welfare maximizing for the government to implement (separating) non-
linear income taxation in which all individuals are willing to reveal their skill types.7
Instead, it may be optimal to pool the individuals, by imposing the same tax treatment
on everyone, so that skill-type information is not revealed. In order to avoid this (ar-
guably uninteresting) possibility, we assume that p is su¢ ciently high so that separation
in period 1 remains optimal; hence the term ￿loose commitment￿ .8 To the best of our
knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst to examine dynamic nonlinear income taxation in a
loose commitment framework. We use the two-type version of the Mirrlees model intro-
duced by Stiglitz [1982], but extend it to an in￿nite-horizon setting. We further assume
that preferences are quasi-linear in consumption. These simpli￿cations lead to a model
that lends itself readily to numerical simulations, which in turn allows us to investigate
5In particular, they all assume that there are only two types of individual, and that the economy
has a ￿nite (two-period) time horizon.
6Likewise, the new dynamic public ￿nance literature has focused mainly on determining optimal
￿tax wedges￿ , i.e., optimal marginal distortions.
7See, e.g., Roberts [1984], Berliant and Ledyard [2005], and Guo and Krause [2010b].
8The term ￿loose commitment￿is taken from Debortoli and Nunes [2010]. They revisit the classic
question of whether taxation should fall predominantly on capital or labor income within a prototyp-
ical dynamic representative-agent model, but where the government can commit only with a certain
probability. Interestingly, these authors show that optimal linear capital and labor income taxes under
loose commitment do not necessarily fall between the optimal levels that prevail in the polar cases of
commitment and no-commitment.
3in detail how loose commitment a⁄ects the characteristics of optimal dynamic nonlinear
income taxation.
Our main ￿nding is that even a small amount of uncertainty regarding whether the
government can commit has a substantial e⁄ect on the design of an optimal dynamic
nonlinear income tax system. In particular, under an empirically plausible parame-
terization, our quantitative results show that high-skill individuals must be subsidized
in period 1, despite the government￿ s redistributive concerns, unless the probability of
commitment is greater than 98%. This is because high-skill individuals know that if
the government cannot commit, they will forever face lump-sum taxation after revealing
their type. Therefore, high-skill individuals require substantial compensation in period 1
if they are to reveal their type, even if the probability that the government cannot com-
mit is negligible. Loose commitment also reverses the short-run welfare e⁄ects of changes
in most parameters. For example, all individuals are worse-o⁄, rather than better-o⁄, in
period 1 when the proportion of high-skill individuals in the economy increases. High-
skill individuals are worse-o⁄ in period 1 when their population rises because they are
better-o⁄ in the long run, which means that they require less compensation in period 1
to reveal their type. But low-skill individuals are also worse-o⁄in period 1, because each
low-skill individual must pay more tax to ￿nance the larger total subsidy received by the
increased population of high-skill individuals. The short-run welfare e⁄ects of varying
wages, the weight low-skill individuals receive in the social welfare function, and the
discount rate, are also shown to be a⁄ected￿ and often reversed￿ by loose commitment.
By simply assuming that the government can commit with probability p and cannot
commit with probability (1 ￿ p), our model has the desirable feature that it reduces to
a model of dynamic nonlinear income taxation with commitment when p = 1, and to
a model of dynamic nonlinear income taxation without commitment when p = 0. An
alternative approach, however, is to assume that in each period there is some probability
that the government can and cannot commit. Accordingly, we examine an extension
of our model in which loose commitment is treated as a Markov switching process.
That is, the probability that the government can commit (resp. not commit) in period
t + 1 depends upon whether it implemented the commitment (resp. no-commitment)
4tax system in period t (where t ￿ 2). It is shown that all of our main conclusions
obtained when the government can simply commit with probability p and not commit
with probability (1 ￿ p) carry-over to this alternative setting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the analytical
framework that we consider, while Section 3 analyzes the structure of optimal dynamic
nonlinear income taxation under loose commitment. The results of our numerical sim-
ulations are discussed in Section 4. An extension of our model to a setting in which
loose commitment is treated as a Markov switching process is examined in Section 5.
Concluding comments are in Section 6, while two appendices contain some additional
mathematical details.
2 Analytical Framework
There is a unit measure of in￿nitely-lived individuals, with a proportion ￿ 2 (0;1) being
high-skill workers and the remaining (1 ￿ ￿) being low-skill workers. The high-skill
type￿ s wage is denoted by wH, while that for the low-skill type is denoted by wL, where
wH > wL. For simplicity, wages are assumed to remain constant through time. The
preferences of both types of individual in each period are represented by the (analytically











i denotes type i￿ s consumption in period t, lt
i denotes type i￿ s labor supply in
period t, while ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0 are preference parameters. Both types of individual
discount the future using the discount factor ￿ = 1
1+r, where r > 0 is the discount rate.
Type i￿ s pre-tax income in period t is given by yt
i = wilt
i. We assume that individuals
cannot save or borrow, which implies that yt
i ￿ ct
i is equivalent to taxes paid (or, if
negative, transfers received) by a type i individual in period t.
The government uses its taxation powers to maximize social welfare, which is as-
sumed measurable by a utilitarian social welfare function weighted towards low-skill
5individuals. The government therefore has a redistributive objective, and it will be
seeking to tax high-skill individuals in order to subsidize low-skill individuals. However,
the government cannot implement (the ￿rst-best) personalized lump-sum taxation in
every period, as each individual￿ s skill type is initially private information. Thus, in
period 1, the government implements (the second-best) incentive-compatible nonlinear
income taxation under which each individual is willing to reveal their skill type. The
key question then is whether the government will use skill-type information revealed in
period 1 to implement personalized lump-sum taxation from period 2 onwards. It is
assumed that all individuals know that the government can commit with probability p,
and therefore cannot commit with probability (1 ￿ p). That is, with probability p the
government will continue to implement incentive-compatible taxation from period 2 on-
wards, but with probability (1￿p) the government will begin to implement personalized
lump-sum taxation. As discussed earlier, it is assumed that p is su¢ ciently high so that
separating taxation remains optimal. As with the individuals, for simplicity we assume
that the government cannot save or borrow. Therefore, the only link between periods is
the revelation and possible use of skill-type information by the government.
3 Optimal Taxation under Loose Commitment
At the end of period 1, the government has enough information to begin implementing
￿rst-best taxation. However, chance decides, with probabilities p and (1 ￿ p), whether
the government can commit and therefore continues to implement second-best taxation,
or whether the government cannot commit and therefore begins to implement ￿rst-best
taxation. In this section, we start by describing optimal taxation from period 2 onwards
when the commitment or no-commitment possibilities are realized. We then describe
optimal taxation in period 1.
3.1 Second-Best Taxation from Period 2 onwards
If the government can commit, its behavior in period t (t = 2;:::;1) can be described
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where equation (3.1) is the weighted utilitarian social welfare function, with ￿ 2 (1
2;1)
being the weight the government attaches to the welfare of low-skill individuals.10 Equa-
tion (3.2) is the government￿ s budget constraint, which requires that total tax revenues be
non-negative. Equation (3.3) is the high-skill type￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint.11
Even though the government knows, based on their ￿rst-period choices, each individual￿ s
skill type, and therefore has enough information to implement personalized lump-sum
taxation, commitment implies that the government does not use this information. It
therefore continues to implement incentive-compatible taxation.





H(￿).12 Substituting these functions into the utility function (2.1) yields ut
iS(￿),
which denotes the utility a type i individual obtains under incentive-compatible (i.e.,
second-best) taxation in period t (t = 2;:::;1).
3.2 First-Best Taxation from Period 2 onwards
If the government cannot commit, it will take advantage of skill-type information re-
vealed in period 1 to implement personalized lump-sum taxation in periods 2;:::;1.
9While we do not observe such tax treatments in practice, the revelation principle implies that
one can model the government as choosing each type￿ s allocation directly subject to the budget and
incentive-compatibility constraints, rather than as specifying a nonlinear income tax system.
10Since we assume that the utility function is quasi-linear in consumption, we must impose the
restriction that ￿ > 0:5 to ensure that the high-skill type￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint is binding.
11The low-skill type￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint is not considered because the government
will use its taxation powers to redistribute from high-skill to low-skill individuals under our model
parameterizations. This creates an incentive for high-skill individuals to ￿mimic￿low-skill individuals,
but not vice versa. Accordingly, the high-skill type￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint will bind at an
optimum, whereas the low-skill type￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint will be slack.
12Further details are provided in Appendix A.
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where the tilde decoration is used to distinguish ￿rst-best variables from their second-
best counterparts. Equation (3.4) is the weighted utilitarian social welfare function,
equation (3.5) is the government￿ s budget constraint, and equation (3.6) is a constraint
that is used to determine the ￿rst-best consumption levels. While quasi-linear prefer-
ences are, in general, analytically convenient, ￿rst-best taxation with such preferences
is not completely determinate.13 However, when preferences take the more general
additively-separable form, u(ct
i) ￿ v(lt
i), with u(￿) increasing and strictly concave and
v(￿) increasing and strictly convex, it is well known that ￿rst-best taxation under a
strict utilitarian (i.e., ￿ = 0:5) objective gives both types the same level of consumption.
We therefore use this insight to determine the ￿rst-best consumption levels by adding
constraint (3.6).14




H(￿) and e yt
H(￿).15 Substituting these functions into the utility function (2.1) yields
ut
iF(￿), which denotes the utility a type i individual obtains under ￿rst-best taxation in
13This has been noted previously by others, e.g., Brett and Weymark [2008]. Speci￿cally, when the
utility function is quasi-linear in consumption (resp. labor), the ￿rst-best levels of consumption (resp.
pre-tax income) cannot be determined.
14While the addition of constraint (3.6) to make ￿rst-best taxation with quasi-linear in consumption
preferences fully determinate might be considered a little ad hoc, it will be shown later that (3.6) has no
real bearing on our main conclusions. This is because our formulation preserves all the salient features
of ￿rst-best taxation generally, namely: (i) both types receive the same level of consumption if ￿ = 0:5,
and low-skill individuals receive more consumption if ￿ > 0:5, (ii) high-skill individuals work longer
than low-skill individuals, (iii) high-skill individuals obtain less utility than low-skill individuals, and
(iv) an individual￿ s utility is decreasing in their wage rate.
15Further details are provided in Appendix A.
8period t (t = 2;:::;1).
3.3 Optimal Taxation in Period 1
In period 1, the government cannot distinguish high-skill from low-skill individuals.
Moreover, each individual knows that after they reveal their type in period 1, the gov-
ernment will solve program (3:1) ￿ (3:3) in periods 2;:::;1 with probability p, and will
solve program (3:4)￿(3:6) in periods 2;:::;1 with probability (1￿p). The government￿ s





















































































where equation (3.7) is the ￿rst-period weighted utilitarian social welfare function, equa-
tion (3.8) is the government￿ s ￿rst-period budget constraint, and equation (3.9) is the
high-skill type￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint.16 In order for a high-skill individual
to be willing to reveal their type, the utility they obtain from choosing hc1
H;y1
Hi in pe-
riod 1 and thus revealing their type, plus the utility a high-skill individual can expect
to obtain from period 2 onwards, cannot be less than the utility a high-skill individual
could obtain by pretending to be low skill by choosing hc1
L;y1
Li in period 1, plus the util-
ity this ￿mimicking￿high-skill individual can expect to obtain from period 2 onwards.
Speci￿cally, a high-skill individual who reveals their type in period 1 can expect to ob-
tain ut
HS(￿) in periods 2;:::;1 with probability p, and ut
HF(￿) in periods 2;:::;1 with
probability (1 ￿ p). A mimicking high-skill individual can also expect to obtain ut
HS(￿)
16We again omit the low-skill type￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint, because it will not be binding
at an optimum.
9in periods 2;:::;1 with probability p, because if the government can commit, a mim-
icking high-skill individual might as well reveal their true type from period 2 onwards
as there is no advantage to be had from continuing to pretend to be low skill.17 But
if the government cannot commit, a mimicking high-skill individual will continue to be
treated as low skill by the government, and in any event they are better-o⁄ under this
arrangement since ut
LF(￿) > ut
HF(￿).18 A mimicking high-skill individual can therefore
expect to obtain ut
LF(￿) in periods 2;:::;1 with probability (1 ￿ p).





H(￿).19 Substituting these functions into the utility function (2.1) yields
u1
iS(￿), which denotes the utility a type i individual obtains under second-best taxation
in period 1.
















That is, an individual￿ s lifetime utility is equal to the utility they obtain in period 1 plus
the utility they can expect to obtain from period 2 onwards.
4 Numerical Simulations
In order to investigate how loose commitment a⁄ects optimal dynamic nonlinear income
taxation, this section undertakes numerical simulations. We ￿rst identify a set of baseline
parameter values for our model that are empirically plausible. The OECD [2010] reports
that on average across OECD countries, approximately one-quarter of all adults have
17It is possible for a high-skill individual to mimic in period 1, and then reveal their true type from
period 2 onwards, because under commitment the government ignores all skill-type information revealed
in period 1.
18The intuition for ut
LF(￿) > ut
HF(￿) is closely related to the standard result that ￿rst-best taxation
under a strict utilitarian objective has an individual￿ s utility decreasing in their wage rate, since all
individuals receive the same level of consumption but higher-wage individuals are required to work
longer. Indeed, this has led some to describe ￿rst-best taxation as Marxist in nature, as it takes from
each individual according to their ability and gives to each individual according to their need.
19Further details are provided in Appendix A.
10attained tertiary level education. We therefore assume that 25% of individuals are high-
skill workers, i.e., we set ￿ = 0:25. Fang [2006] and Goldin and Katz [2007] estimate that
the college wage premium, i.e., the average di⁄erence in the wages of university graduates
over high-school graduates, is approximately 60%. We therefore normalize the low-skill
type￿ s wage to unity (wL = 1) and set the high-skill type￿ s wage at wH = 1:6.
The remaining parameters are chosen on the following basis. If ￿ = 0:5, the social
welfare function is strictly utilitarian, which is a standard assumption in the literature.
However, since we are assuming quasi-linear in consumption preferences, we must impose
the restriction that ￿ > 0:5 to ensure that the high-skill type￿ s incentive-compatibility
constraint is binding. We therefore set ￿ = 0:55 so that our weighted utilitarian social
welfare function is approximately strictly utilitarian. The parameters of the utility
function, ￿ and ￿, are both simply set to unity so that the utility function (2.1) is
quadratic in hours worked. We assume that each period is one-year in length and that
the annual discount rate is 5%, which is in line with common practice. Finally, we assume
that there is a high probability that the government can commit, p = 0:95, which ensures
that separating taxation remains optimal.20 The baseline parameter values are presented
in Table 1.
Table 1 also shows that the baseline utility low-skill individuals obtain in period
1 is almost ten times lower than that obtained by high-skill individuals, whereas the
lifetime utility di⁄erential is less than double. This is because high-skill individuals
require substantial compensation in period 1 for the possibility that they may face ￿rst-
best taxation from period 2 onwards. This possibility is investigated further in Figure
1, which shows the e⁄ects of varying the probability of commitment, p, whilst holding
all other parameters at their baseline levels. The top panel of Figure 1 shows that the
optimal average tax rate faced by high-skill individuals in period 1 is negative, despite
the government￿ s redistributive concerns, unless p > 98%. The intuition is that high-
skill individuals know that if the government cannot commit, revealing their type in
20Separating taxation is not feasible in our model for all p < 0:87, as it would require that low-skill
individuals face an average tax rate of more than 100% in the ￿rst period (holding all other parameters
at their baseline levels).
11period 1 will result in them facing ￿rst-best taxation from period 2 onwards. Therefore,
high-skill individuals have to be compensated in the ￿rst period￿ which comes at the
expense of low-skill individuals￿ for the unfavorable tax treatments they will face after
revealing their type. This result will continue to hold until it is almost certain that the
government can commit when p > 98%. In this case, the compensation required by
high-skill individuals is not so severe that they need to be subsidized in the ￿rst period.
The middle panel of Figure 1 shows the e⁄ects of varying p on ￿rst-period utility
levels. Re￿ ecting the e⁄ects on ￿rst-period average tax rates, the high-skill type￿ s ￿rst-
period utility is decreasing in p, while that for the low-skill type is increasing. The
bottom panel of Figure 1, however, shows that the lifetime utility of high-skill individuals
is increasing in p, while that for low-skill individuals is decreasing. Since in the long run
high-skill individuals are better-o⁄ under second-best taxation and low-skill individuals
are better-o⁄ under ￿rst-best taxation, an increase in p raises the lifetime utility of
high-skill individuals and decreases that of low-skill individuals.
Figure 2 illustrates the e⁄ects of varying the proportion of high-skill individuals in
the economy, ￿, whilst holding the other parameters at their baseline levels. Simulations
are conducted for the baseline loose commitment probability of p = 0:95, as well as for
the case when commitment is certain (p = 1). The left column of Figure 2 shows the
short-run (period 1) e⁄ects on individual welfare, while the right column shows the
long-run (lifetime) e⁄ects. In the long run, both types of individual are better-o⁄ as
￿ increases, whether or not commitment is certain, because society is better-o⁄ with
a larger population of high-skill individuals. That is, because high-skill individuals
have a higher wage than low-skill individuals, an increase in the proportion of high-
skill individuals in the economy increases the economy￿ s endowments, which enables
the government to use its taxation powers to make everyone better-o⁄. Both types of
individual are also better-o⁄in period 1 as ￿ increases if commitment is certain, but both
types are worse-o⁄ in period 1 as ￿ increases under loose commitment. An increase in
￿ reduces the di⁄erence in utility that low-skill and high-skill individuals obtain under
￿rst-best taxation, because the e⁄ective weight that high-skill individuals receive in the
social welfare function, namely (1￿￿)￿, increases. This makes mimicking less attractive,
12which in turn lowers the compensation￿ and hence utility￿ that high-skill individuals
require in period 1 to reveal their type. Low-skill individuals, however, are also worse-
o⁄ in period 1 as ￿ increases. This is because when p = 0:95, high-skill individuals are
subsidized in period 1 (as discussed earlier). An increase in their population therefore
requires more taxation of each low-skill individual in order to satisfy the government￿ s
￿rst-period budget constraint; hence low-skill individuals are also made worse-o⁄.
Figure 3 shows the e⁄ects of varying the wage premium, wH=wL. In the long run,
both types of individual are better-o⁄ as the wage premium increases, whether or not
commitment is certain, simply because an increase in wH=wL corresponds to an increase
in the economy￿ s endowments. Both types are also better-o⁄ in the short run as the
wage premium increases, except for the low-skill type under loose commitment. This is
because under ￿rst-best taxation, the high-skill type￿ s utility is decreasing in the wage
premium.21 Accordingly, an increase in the wage premium raises the compensation that
high-skill individuals require in the ￿rst period to reveal their type. This compensation
comes at the expense of low-skill individuals, who are therefore worse-o⁄ in period 1.
Figure 4 shows the e⁄ects of varying the weight low-skill individuals receive in the
social welfare function, ￿. In the long run, low-skill individuals are better-o⁄, and high-
skill individuals are worse-o⁄, as ￿ rises, whether or not commitment is certain, simply
because the government cares relatively more about the welfare of low-skill individuals.
This pattern of welfare e⁄ects is also obtained in the short run when commitment is cer-
tain, although the numerical simulations suggest that the e⁄ects are negligible. However,
under loose commitment low-skill individuals are worse-o⁄, and high-skill individuals are
better-o⁄, in the short run when ￿ increases. The intuition is that redistribution under
￿rst-best taxation becomes especially severe as ￿ increases, thus making high-skill in-
dividuals worse-o⁄. This increases the compensation they require in period 1 to reveal
their type, which comes at the expense of low-skill individuals. Accordingly, high-skill
individuals are better-o⁄, and low-skill individuals are worse-o⁄, in the short run under
loose commitment when ￿ increases.
21The intuition for this result is analogous to that underlying the standard result whereby an indi-
vidual￿ s utility under ￿rst-best taxation is decreasing in their wage rate.
13Figure 5 shows the e⁄ects of varying the discount rate, r. Simulations are again
conducted for the baseline loose commitment probability (p = 0:95), and for the case
when commitment is certain (p = 1), while holding all other parameters at their baseline
levels. The lifetime utility of both types of individual is decreasing in r, whether or not
commitment is certain, simply because a lower discount factor is used to sum the in￿nite
utility streams. Similarly, when commitment is certain, changes in r have no e⁄ect on
either type￿ s ￿rst-period utility, because the exact same allocation is implemented in
each period and changes in r only a⁄ect the value of utility from period 2 onwards.
However, under loose commitment the low-skill type￿ s ￿rst-period utility is increasing in
r, while that for the high-skill type is decreasing. When r increases, high-skill individuals
discount the future at a greater rate, and therefore care less about the utility they obtain
from period 2 onwards. Accordingly, they require less compensation in period 1 to reveal
their type. This results in high-skill individuals being worse-o⁄in period 1 as r increases,
while low-skill individuals are correspondingly made better-o⁄.
5 Loose Commitment as a Markov Process
Thus far, we have simply assumed that the government can commit with probability p
and cannot commit with probability (1 ￿ p). The advantage of this approach is that,
when p = 1 and p = 0, our model collapses to the polar cases of dynamic nonlinear
income taxation with and without commitment, respectively. Furthermore, variations
in p capture changes in the expectation that either the commitment or no-commitment
tax systems will be implemented. However, an alternative approach is to assume that
after skill-type information is revealed in period 1, there is some chance in each period
from period 2 onwards that the government can and cannot commit. Accordingly, in
this section we model loose commitment as a Markov switching process.
Speci￿cally, suppose as before that with probability p the government implements
the second-best allocation in period 2, and with probability (1 ￿ p) the government
implements the ￿rst-best allocation in period 2. But now, from period 3 onwards, the
probability that the government will implement the second-best or ￿rst-best allocation
14is determined according to the following transition probabilities:
Pr(SB in period t + 1jSB in period t) = qS (5.1)
Pr(FB in period t + 1jFB in period t) = qF (5.2)
That is, if the government implements the second-best (SB) allocation in period t (where
t ￿ 2), there is a probability of qS that it will implement the second-best allocation again
in period t+1, and a probability of (1￿qS) that it will switch and implement the ￿rst-best
(FB) allocation in period t + 1. Likewise, if the government implements the ￿rst-best
allocation in period t (where t ￿ 2), it implements the ￿rst-best allocation again in
period t+1 with probability qF, and it implements the second-best allocation in period
t + 1 with probability (1 ￿ qF).
For each period t ￿ 2, the ￿continuation utility￿of a type i individual can be written




















iS (resp. V t
iF) is type i￿ s continuation utility if the second-best (resp. ￿rst-best)
allocation is implemented in period t (where t ￿ 2). For example, equation (5.3) can
be interpreted as follows. If the government implements the second-best allocation in
period t, a type i individual obtains their second-best utility level ut
iS(￿) in period t, and
with probability qS they continue to obtain their second-best utility level in period t+1,
but with probability (1 ￿ qS) the government switches and they obtain their ￿rst-best
utility level in period t + 1. That is, the continuation utility function V
t+1
iF becomes

















MF + (1 ￿ qF)￿V
t+1
MS (5.6)
15for all periods t ￿ 2.
Since ut
iS(￿) and ut
iF(￿) are time invariant for all t ￿ 2, one may drop the time
superscripts in equations (5:3) ￿ (5:6) and solve for the functions ViS(￿;qS;qF;uiS;uiF),
ViF(￿;qS;qF;uiS;uiF), VMS(￿;qS;qF;uHS;uLF) and VMF(￿;qS;qF;uHS;uLF).22
The government￿ s behavior in period 1 when loose commitment is modelled as a






























































+ p￿VMS(￿) + (1 ￿ p)￿VMF(￿) (5.9)
where equation (5.7) is the ￿rst-period weighted utilitarian social welfare function, equa-
tion (5.8) is the government￿ s ￿rst-period budget constraint, and equation (5.9) is the
high-skill type￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint. A high-skill individual who reveals
their type in period 1 by choosing hc1
H;y1
Hi can expect to obtain a continuation utility
from period 2 of VHS(￿) with probability p, and VHF(￿) with probability (1 ￿ p). On
the other hand, a high-skill individual who mimics in period 1 by choosing hc1
L;y1
Li can
expect to obtain a continuation utility from period 2 of VMS(￿) with probability p, and
VMF(￿) with probability (1 ￿ p). Therefore, in order to induce high-skill individuals to
reveal their type in period 1, the tax treatments must satisfy equation (5.9).





H(￿).23 Substituting these functions into the utility function (2.1) yields
u1
iS(￿), which denotes the utility a type i individual obtains under second-best taxation
22Further details are provided in Appendix B.
23Further details are provided in Appendix B.
16in period 1 when loose commitment is modelled as a Markov process.
Finally, the lifetime utility of a type i individual when loose commitment is modelled
as a Markov process is equal to:
u
1
iS(￿) + p￿ViS(￿) + (1 ￿ p)￿ViF(￿) (5.10)
That is, an individual￿ s lifetime utility is equal to the utility they obtain in period 1 plus
the continuation utility they can expect from period 2.
Next, we use the baseline parameter values in Table 1 to conduct numerical simula-
tions for the Markov model, except we must now also specify values for the transition
probabilities qS and qF. We assume that qS = p = 0:95, in order to maintain the spirit
of loose commitment, i.e., the probability of commitment is high, but not certain. How-
ever, we set qF equal to the (relatively high) value of 0:25, in order to capture the idea
that if the government does happen to implement the ￿rst-best allocation in period t, it
is relatively more likely to implement the ￿rst-best allocation again in period t + 1.24
As it turns out, the simulation results when loose commitment is modelled as a
Markov process are qualitatively identical to those in Figures 1 ￿5 when there is simply
a probability p that the government can commit and a probability (1 ￿ p) that the
government cannot commit. Indeed, it is still the case that high-skill individuals must
be subsidized in period 1 unless the probability of commitment (p = qS) is greater
than 98%. The welfare e⁄ects of varying the remaining parameters, for the cases when
commitment is certain (p = qS = 1) and for the baseline loose commitment probability
(p = qS = 0:95), are also qualitatively the same as before and therefore are not presented
here.25 In sum, all of our main ￿ndings obtained earlier remain robust to modelling loose
commitment as a Markov switching process.
24The baseline transition probabilities of qS = 0:95 and qF = 0:25 are also chosen on the basis that
they ensure that separating taxation remains feasible.
25Details of the numerical simulations when loose commitment is modelled as a Markov switching
process are available upon request.
176 Concluding Comments
Recent interest in dynamic nonlinear income taxation has raised the question of whether
the government can commit to its future tax policy. This paper has shown, perhaps
surprisingly, that a little uncertainty over whether the government can commit has a
substantial impact on the design of an optimal dynamic nonlinear income tax system.
Our quantitative results show that even if commitment is almost certain, high-skill in-
dividuals must be subsidized in the short run, despite the government￿ s redistributive
objective, in order to compensate them for the possibility that they may forever face
lump-sum taxation after revealing their type. We have also shown that loose com-
mitment reverses almost all of the short-run welfare e⁄ects of changes in the model￿ s
parameters. Finally, we have obtained these conclusions when the government can sim-
ply commit with probability p and not commit with probability (1 ￿ p), or when loose
commitment is modelled as a Markov switching process.
In order to undertake a detailed investigation into how loose commitment a⁄ects
optimal dynamic nonlinear income taxation, we have used a simple model that lends
itself readily to numerical simulations. The question remains as to how dependent our
results are on the speci￿cs of the model. However, based on the nature of the intuition
driving our results, we think that most would continue to hold in more general settings,
e.g., under di⁄erent preference assumptions. This is because most of our arguments do
not depend upon the speci￿cs of the model, but instead rely on the general fact that
low-skill individuals are better-o⁄ under ￿rst-best taxation and high-skill individuals
are better-o⁄under second-best taxation. Likewise, if the model were extended to more
than two skill types, we think our main conclusions would remain intact because an
individual￿ s utility is increasing in wages under second-best taxation, but decreasing in
wages under ￿rst-best taxation. Thus higher-wage types will prefer second-best taxation,
and lower-wage types will prefer ￿rst-best taxation. Nevertheless, extending the model
to settings with di⁄erent preferences and more than two skill types present worthwhile
avenues for future research.
Other possible extensions include making the probability of commitment endogenous.
18For example, since low-skill individuals are better-o⁄under ￿rst-best taxation and high-
skill individuals are better-o⁄under second-best taxation, each type has an incentive to
petition the government to use either ￿rst-best or second-best taxation. Accordingly,
extending our model to include some sort of lobbying behavior by individuals would be
interesting, although it would change the analysis from being purely normative in nature
to also being partly positive. Finally, the only link between periods in our model is the
revelation and possible use of skill-type information by the government. An extension
to a setting in which there are other dynamic links, such as savings, would also be worth
pursuing.
7 Appendix A
Program (3.1) ￿(3.3): Further Details




































































t = ￿[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿] (A.5)







￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (A.6)
is the multiplier on the high-skill type￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint (3.3).
19Program (3.4) ￿(3.6): Further Details




￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)e yt
L + ￿e yt
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￿[￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
(A.11)
is the multiplier on the government￿ s budget constraint (3.5).
Program (3.7) ￿(3.9): Further Details
















































































iF(￿), which follows from
noting that ut
iF(￿) is the same in each period, and:
￿
1 = ￿[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿] (A.16)





￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (A.17)
is the multiplier on the high-skill type￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint (3.9).
8 Appendix B
Continuation Utility Functions: Further Details
After dropping the time superscripts, equations (5.3) and (5.4) can be solved to yield:
ViS =




(1 ￿ ￿qS)uiF(￿) + ￿(1 ￿ qF)uiS(￿)
1 ￿ ￿ [￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(qF + qS)]
(B.2)
Likewise, equations (5.5) and (5.6) can be solved to yield:
VMS =




(1 ￿ ￿qS)uLF(￿) + ￿(1 ￿ qF)uHS(￿)
1 ￿ ￿ [￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(qF + qS)]
(B.4)
Program (5.7) ￿(5.9): Further Details































































1 = ￿[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿] (B.9)





￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (B.10)
is the multiplier on the high-skill type￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint (5.9).
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π 0.55  γ 1.00  L w   1.00 
φ  0.25  δ 0.95  H w   1.60 
α  1.00  r 0.05                  p  0.95 
      
   Period 1  Lifetime     
Utility: low-skill type  0.227  13.140     















































Effects of varying r 
 
 
 